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Soviet “Expansionism" 
The di:ficulty of placing Soviet policy toward ]apan in the early 
phase of the occupation in. historical perspective stems， 1 believe， 
from the pitfalls inherent in writing any history of intemational 
relations. In creating such a chronicle， we usually focus on the actions 
of only one side， attempting to uncover the logic of a nation's 
The tendency to c部 tthe conduct of the behavior from its actions. 
country in question in terms of aggression or expansionism is a 
natural con舵quenceof this approach. 
early 生heduring behavior diplomatic Soviet of Analyses 
Occupation period that focus on the U.S.S.R. alone al1士00easi1y 
come to the simplistic conclusion that it is a classic case of 
“expansionist" foreign policy. The argument goes something like 
?????
this: on August 9， 1945， Stalin broke the neutrality pact between 
]apan and the U.S.S.R.， entering the war only days before its end. On 
August 12， Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov demand-
ed that the United States accept a joint侃 cupationunder the dual 
command of Marshal Vasi1evsky and General MacArthur. (The 
Americans refused to comply.) on 16 August， Stalin demanded that 
the Kurile Islands and the northern half of Hokkaido be included 
among the areas that were to surrender directly to the supreme 
(Although President Truman commander of the Soviet forces. 
agreed on August 17 to let the U.S.S.R. have the Kuriles， the Soviets 
were not allowed to take surrender of Hokkaido's northern half.) ln 
the latter part of September， after finally assenting to the Far 
Eastern Advisory Committee-centered consultative regime proposed 
by the United States， the Soviet Union changed its mind and began 
to call for the establishment of a control regime in a move to apply 
The problem of the German model to J apanese occupation policy. 
Allied troop dispatchment is also viewed as fitting the pattern. The 
Soviet Union wanted to send troops to Japan to conduct a sepatate 
司zoneoccupation such as that carried out in Germany， but was not 
wi1ling to place its own expenditionary force under the command of 
General MacArthur. 
However these actins may be interpreted， historians tend to see 
them as evidence of an aggressive policy toward J apan. They even 
try to prove the existence of a Far Eastern arm of Soviet expan・
sionist policy by pointing out， inaddition， that in the end the U.S.S. 
R. did take possession of the Kurile Islands. They then proceed to 
place the early phase of the occupation of Japan， seen as an arena of 
the interplay of forces in the Cold War， inthe rigid old framework 
of Soviet expansionism vs. American status quo-ism， the forces of ?????
aggression vs. the forces for peace. 
It hardly needs noting that the recent trend in interpretations of 
the occupation of Japan are aftected by developments in the second 
Cold War sparked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan， which has 
fostered a mood of Soviet-phobia. What 1 wish to do here is to 
examine whether it is viable to treat the history of Soviet policy 
toward J apan in the early phase of the occupation simply within the 
paradigm of Soviet expansionism. 1t is possible， 1 believe， that the 
image we have of Soviet foreign policy at that time may be the 
unhappy result of a one-sided approach to the history of inter-
national relations in which Soviet behavior is taken out of context 
and in which the United States is referred to only in terms of what 
Washington did in response. 
U nderstanding Societ Diplomacy 
To grasp the logic of a country's behavior， one must view its 
actions not from the standpoint of their cause， but in terms of results. 
Essentially， what 1 am suggesting is that a country's behavior must 
be understood in the context of the dynamic interplay of inter-
national relations. When viewed in this manner， we shall see that the 
true logic of Soviet diplomacy in the immediate postwar period is far 
more complicated than the simplistic image outlined above. 
1n considering Soviet foreign policy in the early occupation 
period， we should first note several characteristics peculiar to 
postwar Soviet foreign policy that had already manifested them-
selves. This was， first of aU， the time when the Soviet Union first 五
began to conduct itself consciously as a superpower or polar power ム
/、
in foreign affairs. Any great power that has built up its strength ~ 
relative to other countries strives to use that strength to expand its 
influence among surrounding states. lmmediately after the end of 
hostilities， that general tendency is given further impetus by internal 
The Soviet forces intent on securing a share of the spoils of war. 
Union， having joined the great powers during World War I， labored 
underthe “orig泊alsin" of great power diplomacy from the outset in 
its postwar foreign po}icy. 
Secondly， Soviet superpower diplomacy加mostcases had more 
in common with European-style closed-door， sphere-of-influence 
diplomacy than with American's open-door imperialist diplomacy， 
no doubt resulting from the traditional Soviet complex regarding 
N evertheless， Stalin's postwar diplomacy shows national security. 
印1one hand， itshared something with an interesting duality. 
Chruchill's imperialist scheme for the break-up of power in the 
Balkans. Through his eftorts to fragment power in Eastem Europe 
(including the Balkan states) and to secure intemational recognition 
of Soviet preponderance in Poland， Bulgaria， and Rumania， he 
managed to put Soviet anxieties about its security to rest. 
白1the other hand， however， Soviet policy was compatible with 
Roo団 velt'sglobal policy of securing control by Allied powers of 
strategic bases throughout the world to prevent the res町genceof 
militarism in Germany and ]apan. The location of the Kurile Islands 
in出isconnection should not be overlooked. The s民 retprovision of 
the Yalta agreement of February 11， 1945， which ceded the Kurile 
Islands to出.eU.S.S.R.， is often seen as indicating that Franklin D. 
Roosevelt knew nothing of the historical circumstances or strategic 
?????
signficance of ceding the Kurile Islands when he “thoughtlessly" 
consented to grant Stalin's demand. Sometimes added to this is出e
plausible explanation that Roosevelt， who died only a month leter， 
was already suffering from impaired judgment. 
Actually， however， the United States had already discussed and 
repeatedly confirmed its agreement to tum the Kurile Islands over to 
the U.S.S.R. at the meetings held in Yalta on February 4， 8， and 10. 
Teheran and Cairo the to 1943--prior October m 民1:oreover，
conferences and a year and a half before the Yalta conference 
-ーRoosevelt himse1f had stated that出eKurile Islands ought to be 
tumed over to the Soviet Union. 1 would also stress the fact that the 
Kurile Islands had a dual significance for both the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. They were important firstly as strategic bases that the 
Allies felt they had to be in control of in order to prevent Germany 
and J apan from tuming once again to militarism following the end of 
Other such strategic bases included Dakar and Bizerte in the war. 
Africa and the Ryukyus， Ogasawaras (Bonin Islands)， and Guam in 
Secondly， and出isis more widely known， the Kuriles East Asia. 
were prime examples of the booty of war--the lever used to secure 
Soviet participation in出ewar against J apan. 
In any case， we must bear in mind that the Soviet Union at the 
time of the Yalta conference was considered by the United States a 
comrade who would support the postwar world order as Roosvelt 
and his advi田rsenvisioned it and a nation that could be expected to 
cooperate in translating that vision into reality. The Kurile Islands 
?????were regarded as among the keys in sustaining that amicable 
relationship. This is why the United States (or， more specifically， the 
U.S. military) included in its scheme for the postwar world order a 
plan to田tup a military base on one of the Kurile Islands， even as 
it decided to hand over the island chain to the Russians. The plan to 
build a U.S. military base in the Kurile Islands appears in SWNCC 
(State-W ar-N avy Coordinationg Committee) decuments and was 
discussed as early as May 1945. On Augusut 16， 1945， Stalin 
demanded the revision of Truman's General Order N o.1， dated 
August 15， toinclude the Kurile Islands among the territories that 
were to surrender to the supreme commander of the Soviet Far East 
forces in accordance with the Yalta agreement. Truman， inan 
August 17 reply to Stalin agreeing to the revision， asked in return for 
the right to establish an air base for military and civilian use 
somewhere in the Kuriles， preferably in the central area. He did this 
out of recognition of the key role the Kurile Islands played in the 
security scheme of the postwar world order. The exchange between 
Stalin and Truman came to a temporary settlement with the United 
States obtaining from the Soviet Union the right to maintain an air 
base in the Kuriles in return for its promise to actively support the 
permanent Soviet occupation of the entire Kurile chain. For both 
superpowers， the Kurile Islands were strantegic footholds in the 
postwar effort to counter the expansionist threat of former enemies 
Germany and J apan. In this sense， the islands， destined to be ceded 
to the Soviet Union， were a key link in the alliance that supported U. 
S.-Soviet coexistence. 
The third notable aspect of postwar Soviet diplomatic style was 
五 alsoobservable， albeit to a greater extent， in the more recent 
= Andropov and Brezhnev regimes. This is the way in which the 
宍 diciお凶s討ionγ』叩a北ki加ngmachinery of Soviet diplomacy embraces two 
foreign policy lines that are in a subtle sense potentially antagonistic. 
This unobtrusive duality in Soviet diplomacy can be seen in the 
differences between the responses of Stalin and Molotov to U.S. 
Secretary of State James Byrne's“A-bomb diplomacy." 
The same duality in Soviet leadership manifests itself in the 
to此uousdiplomatic exchange regarding the system under which 
J apan would be a伽unisteredthat transpired between the United 
States加 d出eU.S.S.R. On October 24 and 25， 1945， Averell 
Harriman， the American ambassador to the Soviet Union， conducted 
two days of intensive talks centering on the Japan issue with Stalin 
At the田 talks，Stalin expres田d出eat the latter's villa at Gagri. 
First， the following ideas with regard to policy toward J apan. 
system of administration should follow the Balkan pattern， not the 
In other words， the United States should take German pattem. 
charge of the occupation single-handedly instead of having al the 
Allied powers send troops to Japan for a joint occupation. Second， 
he thought that some kind of control mechanism ought to be set up 
to consider basic issues in government such as revision of the 
In the constitution and the type of political system to be adopted. 
ultimate the thought， he apparatus， an of such establishment 
authority should be vested in MacArthur， inthe same way出at
ultimate authority in the councils of Rumania and Bulgaria was 
It would be b田tfrom the vested in the Soviet commander. 
standpoint of MacArthur's maintaining the ultimate authority if the 
other Allied powers did not send any troops to Japan. ?????
the with began， Harriman Stalin， with Having conferred 
approvaI of Washington， todraft the “authority clause embodying 
the concrete terms that would provide for a system of administration 
in Japan. But at this stage Molotov made a demand that superseded 
He tried to the agreement reached betwen Harriman and Stalin. 
attach a proviso to the granting of supreme authority to MacArthur. 
of unanimous principle invoke the was probably to alm His 
agreement among the four major Allied powers--i.e.， the principle of 
Byrnes State of Secretary fact how This is in veto rights. 
The difference between this diplomatic interpreted it at the time. 
action on the part of Molotov and Stalin's proposal made in Gagri 
can be understood as a manifestation of the friction generated by the 
con幽and of conciliatory Kremlin coexistence in the delicate 
frontational lines in policy toward J apan. 
But one wonders why Stalin， Molotov， and other Soviet decision 
一makerssettled on the curious policy that the Soviet Union should 
not sent troops to Japan， but leave the whole occupation up to the 
United States. This policy is“curious，" however， only if one adheres 
to the logic that Soviet postwar foreign policy was premised on 
expansionism or great power diplomacy. 
Because of the assumption of Soviet expansionism， the explana-
tion given for the U.S.S.R.'s decision not to send troops and take part 
in the occupation is bound to be a curious one. William Sebald， head 
He of the Diplomatic Section of SCAP， 1947-52， fel into that trap. 
came to the conclusion， without su節cientlysubstantiating it in 
MacArthur because demurred Soviets that the facts， histrical 
Honshu central of portion heaviIy-bombed a them assigned 
Catherine forces. American by sides both on surrounded 
?????
by citing argument this supports unfortunately， R. Edwards， 
Japan， (?). 
Ocωpation 
m 
American 
MacArthur 
The 
With 
Remaking Japan: 
memOlrs， Sebald's 
Cohen's 
portion of 
Theodore 
As New Deal (Herbert Passin ed.， 1987) takes the same approach 
on this point. 
Change in Soviet Policy 
Why， although it This question， moreover， leads to others. 
approved the idea for a Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC) 
proposed by the United States， did the Soviet Union turn around in 
early September and oppose the U.S. draft for establishing the 
FEAC， and continue thereafter to raise objections to the American 
design for the machinery of the J apanese occupation? What had 
happened to amiable relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in September and October of 1945? What brought about 
the change in the Soviet Union's policy toward Japan? 
The first clue to the answers to these questions lies in that was 
Conservativism and reactionarism happening in J apan at the time. 
On August 15， 1945， Japan， having were on the rise that autumn. 
agreed to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration， unconditionally 
surrendered to the Allied powers， promising to set up“in accordance 
with the freely expressed wiIl of the Japanese people…a peacefully 
The AIlied--iム Americaninclined and responsible government". 
--occupation policy， as set forth in SWNCC-150， caHed for the 
??
?
??
utilization of the existing Japanese administrative machinery in 
As a natural con-carrying out the occupation of the country. 
sequence of this indirect administration， itwas the oId ruling cIass， 
minus the military， that formed the core of the postwar poIiticaI 
Higasikuni Naruhiko， Japan's first postwar prime minister， worId. 
was of imperial blood， his successor， Shidehara Kijuro， was a baron， 
and Y oshida Shigeru， substantial coauthor of the memorial Prince 
1945 February presented to the Emperor in Konoe Fumimaro 
expressing fear of the threat of“communization of J apan and Soviet 
expansion in J apan， had been a member of the prewar oligarchy. 
As the old guard recovered its strength in the fal and winter of 
1945， itbegan to fan anticommunist feeling and encourage U.S. 
-Soviet confrontation. Using the Soviet “threat as a rallying call， it
forged an alliance with the GII-centered anti-Soviet faction of SCAP 
in an attempt to seize the political initiative camp coincided with the 
rise of what might be called the “conditional surrender faction" in 
。伍ces.and other government the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Together， they set out to revise the constitution in accordance with 
the ideas and under the guidance of the old liners. This would assure 
the continuance， virtually without change， of the system as it had 
functioned under the乱-1eijiConstitution， pivoting as before on the 
notion of the divinity of the emperor. 
Konoe was commissioned by the Emperor to draft a revised 
constitution， and he began to work in collaboration with Professor 
Around the Sasaki Soichi after visiting MacArthur on October 4. 
same time， Prime Minister Shidehara ordered a separate effort to 
revise the costitution under the leadership of Matsumoto Joji， a 
But， as George Atcheson， head of the Office of Minister of State. 
Political Advisors of SCAP， wired Byrnes in Washington on October 
24， the work of constitutional revision was intended only to preserve 
?????
?
the power of the old guard by keeping the Emperor-centered Meiji 
constitution virtually intact. 
Watching these developments unfold， the Soviet Union， and the 
American occupation authorities as well， naturally became very il at 
For the Soviets， the ascendency of anti-Soviet elements ease. 
combined with the continuation of the Meiji constitutional system 
could only be viewed as a burgeoning threat potentially dangerous 
to Soviet security. Stalin expressed his apprehension on this account 
Pravda also carried repeated warnings about the more than once. 
For Soviet diplomats， the form of the postwar J apanese situation. 
J apanese political system and the issues of constitutional revision 
and democratization were matters of the greatest concern. 
The Soviet anxiety that the resurgence of the old guard in J apan 
was tantamount to a threat to its national security is understandable 
considering the history of imperial J apanese aggression against 
czarist Russia and later the U.S.S.R. The same fear for national 
security， albeit of a more intense degree， set the foundations of the 
Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe early in the postwar period. lt 
was first manifested in the Soviet support of the Lublin administra-
pro-Soviet attempt to back the and later in tion in Poland， 
administrations in Bulgaria and Rumania. 
At the time， the Soviet Union had two security-related demands， 
fulfillment of which is considered crucial to a U.S. -Soviet alIiance. 
wanted to seize the initiative in Rumania and Moscow First， 
it Second，Americans. leave to the would Japan Bulgaria. ??????
demanded that the other Allied nations tolerate Soviet intervention 
in J apan to the extent that England， the United States， and the others 
The Soviet 
intervention in J apan should not consist of the sending of an 
were allowed to intervene in Rumania and Bulgaria. 
occupation force or any other military involvement， but of making a 
final check on more fundamental problems such as the nature of the 
J apanese political system. 
For these reasons， Stalin， inexpressing Soviet views concerning 
J apan at his vi1a in Gagri， gave almost the same amount of time to 
the issue of political organization in Rumania and Bulgaria as to the 
Harriman， through secure， to attempting problem，" “Japan 
American understanding of Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe. 
Whi1e insisting that the Soviet Union be given a part in the control 
machinery of the Japanese occupation， Stalin repeatedly impressed 
upon Harriman the conviction that J apan ought to be left to 
Harriman， inful understanding MacArthur and the United States. 
several on Truman and advised Byrnes assertions， of Stalin's 
occasions that the creation of a system of U.S.-Soviet coexistence in 
East Asia was an essential condition for peace and seeurity in the 
postwar world. 
Regrettably， however， for Harriman and the faction that， like 
him， favored a conci1iatory attitude toward the Soviets， American 
policy toward the U.S.S.R. was inherently inc1ined in the opposite 
The rise of direction and showed every sign of becoming more so. 
the pro-confrontation faction had at this time left an indelible mark 
This did not come to pass on American policy-making circ1es. 
strongly ロlorewere advisers simply because Truman and his 
anticommunist and anti-Soviet than Roosevelt and his administra-
??????
Rather， the problem was that anticommunist tion before them. 
Vandenberg 
included， and Democratic hawks such as Tom Connally， played， 
and Dulles party， Republican the “hawks" within 
under the guise of bipartisan diplomacy， a role in the Truman 
administration foreign policy decision-making that cannot be 
ignored. 
Dulles in the San Francisco and London conferences in 1945， and 
Vandenberg and Connally in the Moscow and Paris conferences from 
1945 to 1946， respectively， attempted to check the implementation of 
Bymes' appeasement policy， favoring， instead， one of non-appease-
ment. Their basic objective in these efforts， which gives some 
indication of the magnitude of their role， was the revision of the 
Yalta agreement itself. In effect， these Americans tried to invalidate 
the series of Yalta decisions goveming territory from Poland to the 
Far East， from the Oder-Neisse line to the Kurile Islands. At the 
very least they were bent on modifying those decisions so that the 
terms would be more advantageous to the United States. 
Interstingly， these moves on the part of Dulles， Vandenburg， and 
others overlapped with the postwar American Soviet policy of 
Bymes， Stimson， Harriman， and other advisors within the Truman 
administration who were relatively sympathetic with the conciliato-
ry line. In fact， the latter group wanted to make the atomic bomb， 
acquired through the success of their country's nuclear development 
program， the principal weapon of postwar diplomacy and tried to 
obtain through that means the desired Soviet commitment to the 
“open-door policy"， thereby extending the “American world order" 五
from Eastem Europe to the Middle and N ear East， Manchuria， and ェ
/， 
even to the Soviet Union itself. We can find symbolic examples of 
th白eefforts in their long-championed dream of an intemationalized C 
Danube， the idea of breaking up the Soviet Union into 15 republics， 
and the movement calling on the Soviet Union to implement the open 
-door policy in Manφuria. 
In any ca配， this series of anti-Soviet diplomatic offensives on 
the part of the United States exacerbated the Soviet Union's security 
complex and made it al the more stubbornly determined to see that 
the global order envisioned at Yalta and the agreements made there 
be brought to reality. For the Soviets， Yalta did not stand only for 
conditions for continuing the U.S.-Soviet alliance; it had also 
Gaining functioned to relieve出eiranxieties regarding security. 
ultra-出epreventing and lslands Kurile 出eof possesslOn 
nationalistic constitutional system from emerging in ]apan had 
increasingly taken on meaning for the Soviet Union as conditions for 
peace in the Far East. 
ln other words， the Soviet occupation of the Kurile lslands and 
the satisfactory revision of ] apanese constitution were already 
destined at the beginning of the postwar period to function as 
conditions for coexistence in the Far East. In the foぽ decadessince 
the end of the war， movements for revision of the constitution and 
return of the Kurile Islands to ]apan have repeatedly appeared， hand 
The fact in hand with revivals of the theory of the Soviet threat. 
that th閃emovement are central to the attempt to construct an 
alternative history of the postwar period more than anything else 
attests to the validity of the foregoing analysis. ??????
